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RECENT DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-GRANDFATHER
CLAUSE
IN
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT PERMITS THE
PRESIDENT

TO BAN

TRAVEL

TO CUBA

WITHOUT DECLARING

AN

EMERGENCY, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs, United States citizens who wished to travel to Cuba,

brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury claiming that
United States regulations banning travel to Cuba lacked statutory
authority and were unconstitutional.1 In promulgating the regulations in 1982,2 the President had failed to declare a peacetime
emergency as required by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA).3 Plaintiffs asserted that the absence of
4
emergency executive authority rendered the regulations invalid.
Alternatively, plaintiffs asserted that even if statutory authority
existed for the President's actions, the regulations presented an
1. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3029-30 (1984).
2. In 1982, existing Treasury Department regulations were amended to prohibit all travel to Cuba except for official visits, news gathering, professional research, and visits to close relatives. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1)(1984). General
tourist and business travel were specifically prohibited. Id. § 515.560(a)(3). General travel to Cuba had been permitted under regulations promulgated six years
earlier. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977) (repealed 1984).
3. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201-208, 91 Stat. 1625, 162629 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982)). Enacted in 1977, IEEPA superseded the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. § 1-44 (1982).
TWEA, originally enacted in 1917 and amended in 1941, gave the President
broad emergency powers in times of both war and peace. In 1977 Congress essentially left the President's TWEA wartime powers unchanged, but required
the President to declare peacetime emergencies under IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(a), and report to Congress every six months on actions taken after the declaration. Id. § 1703(c).
4. Because peacetime powers under TWEA had been repealed and the President had not followed the procedural requirements of JEEPA, plaintiffs claimed
there was no statutory authority for the regulations. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3032.
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unconstitutional burden on their fifth amendment liberty to
travel abroad.5 Defendant 6 acknowledged that the President had
not followed IEEPA's declaration procedures. He claimed, however, that the President's authority in this case arose from a
grandfather clause in IEEPA that allows the President to continue asserting emergency authorities being exercised in 1977
without declaring a new emergency.7 Defendant reasoned that because in 1977 the President had been regulating certain travelrelated transactions between United States citizens and Cuba, the
President's authority to issue further travel-related restrictions,
such as a travel ban, had been preserved." The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction." On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, while not reaching
the constitutional issue, 10 held that because the President was not
asserting his specific authority to ban travel to Cuba in 1977, the
grandfather clause did not provide a source of authority for a future travel ban.1 ' On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, reversed. Held: (1) Presidential authority existed to
prevent plaintiffs' travelling to Cuba after enactment of IEEPA
because the President had been regulating certain travel-related
transactions on the date specified by the statute's grandfather
clause, thus preserving authority to issue general travel restrictions at a later date; (2) the need to curtail the flow of hard currency to a country supporting armed violence and terrorism in
the Western Hemisphere provides an adequate basis for restricting an individual's fifth amendment liberty to travel to that
country.
5.

Id. at 3038.

6. Because the regulations banning travel to Cuba had been promulgated by
the Treasury Department, Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, was the
named defendant.
7. 104 S. Ct. at 3032-33.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3030.
10. Plaintiff claimed that IEEPA was unconstitutional if it was construed to
permit the President to ban travel abroad. Because the First Circuit did not
construe the IEEPA to permit a travel ban, the constitutional issue became
moot. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 795 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026
(1984).
11. 708 F.2d at 800.
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II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Authority
Congress enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) 12
in 1917 to enable the President to respond to economic emergencies during wartime. Section 5(b) of the Act gave the President
wartime powers to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit" any transactions between the United States and foreign countries or their
residents.13 In 1933, Congress amended the Act to authorize the
Executive to invoke its special powers during peacetime emergencies, enabling President Roosevelt to proclaim the 1933 Bank
Holiday." A 1941 amendment augmented executive power to
block certain transnational transactions, authorizing the President to "vest" or "liquidate" the property involved.' 5 The four
emergencies 16 technically in effect under the TWEA were termi12. Trading With the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as TWEA]. For discussions of the early history of TWEA, see Hand, Jr., The Trading With the Enemy Act, 19 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (1919); Comment, The Trading With the
Enemy Act, 35 YALE L.J. 345 (1926). For discussion of the later development of
TWEA, see Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of
the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-20
(1977)(statement of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld); id. at 20-31 (statement of
Prof. Harold G. Maier) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
13. TWEA, supra note 12, § 5(b), 40 Stat. at 415 (amended 1977).
14. The 1933 Bank Holiday was the first dramatic act of the Roosevelt Administration. President Roosevelt was inaugurated on Saturday, March 4, 1933,
as the collapse of the entire United States banking system appeared imminent.
In his inaugural speech the new President declared, "the only thing we have to
fear is fear itself." The next day he proclaimed a national bank holiday and
called Congress to meet in special session the following Thursday. On Thursday,
March 9, Congress passed legislation ratifying the bank holiday and the numerous other executive actions taken during the interval. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1,
§ 1, 48 Stat. 1 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 956 (1982)). The Act also granted the
President section 5(b) powers "during the time of war or any other period of
national emergency declared by the President." Id. § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (amended
1977). The following Sunday evening, March 12, 1933, President Roosevelt delivered his first fireside chat explaining how the reopening of the banks would be
managed and what the public could do to help make the process orderly. The
next day he legalized beer. See generally FJL. ALLEN, SINCE YESTERDAY (1939).
15. Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 838, 839-40 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95(a)(1) & 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1982)).
16. President Nixon's Balance of Payments Emergency, Proclamation No.
4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1971), reprinted in 85 Stat. 926 (1971); President Nixon's
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nated in 1976 by the passage of the National Emergency Act
(NEA).' 7 President Truman's emergency declaration issued at the
start of the Korean Conflict in 1950,1s has served as a source of
authority for Presidents to control transactions with all communist nations. Pursuant to this ongoing "emergency," the Kennedy
Administration issued regulations prohibiting transactions with,

and travel to, Cuba. 19 These regulations remained in effect until
early 1977, when the Treasury Department promulgated regulations permitting travel to Cuba.20 Thus, travel to Cuba was permitted when Congress enacted IEEPA to limit Presidential powers under the TWEA. 2 1 Passage of IEEPA essentially reenacted
the authority of TWEA with several important limiting provisions. 22 IEEPA requires the President to declare peacetime emer-

Postal Strike Emergency, Proclamation No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. 473 (1970), reprinted
in 84 Stat. 2222 (1970); President Truman's Korean Emergency, Proclamation
No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 71 (1950), reprinted in 64 Stat. A454 (1950); and President
Roosevelt's Bank Emergency, Proclamation No. 2039, 3 C.F.R. 120.1 (1982), reprinted in 48 Stat. 1691 (1933), were still in effect in 1976.
17. National Emergency Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-22, 1631, 1641, 1651
(1982). The National Emergency Act and IEEPA were part of a common statutory scheme designed to limit Presidential powers. The NEA terminated the
four existing Presidentially declared emergencies and established procedures for
the declaration of future emergencies. The NEA requires emergencies to be officially declared by publication in the Federal Register, 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a), and
allows emergencies to be terminated by Congressional concurrent resolutions or
by Presidential proclamations. Id. § 1622(a). IEEPA addresses the actions that a
President may take once an emergency is declared, and defines the types of
Presidential actions that require an emergency declaration. See 50 U.S.C. §
1701-1706. For an extensive discussion of the NEA, see Note, The National
Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's Crisis Powers with the Need
for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453 (1979).
18. See supra note 16.
19. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1964).
20. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.560-.561 (1977). The new regulations exempted travelrelated transactions from the general ban on transactions with Cuba in the earlier regulation. Specifically, the 1977 regulations were enacted to permit "persons who visit Cuba to pay for their transportation and maintenance expenditures (meals, hotel bills, taxis, etc.) while in Cuba." 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621 (1977).
21. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 796. The regulations repealing the travel
ban were issued in March 1977, see 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.560-.561 (1977), and Congress set July 1, 1977, as the effective date of the grandfather clause for regulations enacted under TWEA. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, supra note 3, § 101(b), 91
Stat. at 1625.
22. For discussion of the purpose and impact of IEEPA, see Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to
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2 4 Because
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for the
duration' and
of any
emergency.
not

Control PresidentialEmergency Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (1983); Note,
PresidentialEmergency Powers Related to International Economic Transactions: Congressional Recognition of Customary Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1978).
23. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982).
24. Id. § 1703(c). Other limiting aspects of IEEPA include the deletion of
Presidential powers to "vest property, .... regulate domestic transactions," and
"seize documents." The President had held these powers in peacetime emergencies under the TWEA. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
The first major test for IEEPA's limiting provisions came in the aftermath of
the Iranian hostage crisis. Pursuant to a declared emergency, President Carter
ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations that suspended the
attachment of Iranian assets by United States courts. 31 C.F.R. 535.218 (1984).
The President also ordered that the assets be transferred to a security account.
Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919. This account ultimately was to be
disbursed at the behest of an international tribunal. 31 C.F.R. § 535.212 (1984).
Dames & Moore International had obtained attachments on certain Iranian assets in a United States district court after an Iranian instrumentality had
breached a contract for power plant feasibility studies. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 664 (1981). Dames & Moore argued that the deletion by
IEEPA of the executive's power to "vest property" prohibited the President
from transferring assets to the tribunal. Id. at 672 n.5. The Court, noting
IEEPA's reaffirmation of the President's powers to "compel, nullify and void
transfers of property," placed little significance on the deletion of the vesting
provision. Id. The Court held that IEEPA granted the President the authority
to transfer assets abroad, id. at 674, and that the general tenor of IEEPA and
other executive power legislation, combined with the President's authority to
conclude executive agreements, provides the President with the authority to
suspend proceedings in United States courts. Id. at 686.
It is particularly noteworthy that although IEEPA was originally conceived to
limit executive power, the Court characterized it as part of a "sweeping and
unqualified" grant of executive power. Id. at 671 (quoting Chas. T. Main Int'l,
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1981)).
Oddly, although the Court expanded IEEPA into a source of implied Presidential powers, id. at 677, it sought to limit its holding by emphasizing the extraordinary nature of the hostage crisis. See id. at 688. For an excellent discussion of Dames & Moore, see Marks & Grabow, The President's Foreign
Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation By Acquiescence,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 68 (1982). See also Recent Decision, Executive
Power-PresidentHas the Power to Block and Transfer IranianAssets, Nullify
PrejudgmentAttachments, and Suspend Claims of United States Nationals in
Implementing Executive Agreement for Release of Hostages, 15 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 347 (1982); Recent Development, Claims Settlement: Executive
Action Limiting Suits Against Iran-Dames & Moore v. Regan, 22 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 661 (1981); Note, The United States-Iranian Hostage Agreement: A
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wish to force the President to redeclare existing emergencies in
order to maintain long standing policies, it inserted a grandfather
clause in IEEPA that permits the President to maintain certain
authorities granted under the TWEA without requiring compliance with the statute's new procedural mandates.2 5 Because a
broad grandfather clause would have defeated the Act's purpose,
and a narrow one would have necessitated a redeclaration of
emergencies, Congress sought to draft a limited provision that extended only existing uses of international emergency authorities.2 6
The clause provides:
[T]he authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of
the Trading With the Enemy Act. . ., which were being exercised
with respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national
emergency declared by the President before such date, may continue to be exercised with respect to such country ....
The use of the phrase "authorities. . .being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977," could be subject to conflicting
interpretations. First, the clause might be interpreted to preserve
only specific authorities in use on that date, such as the trade
embargo to Cuba. Alternatively, the clause might be construed to
preserve all possible authorities granted under the TWEA as long
as some authority was being used with respect to a given country
on that date. Under the latter, the less restrictive view, the existence of one type of restriction in connection with a country, such
as a trade embargo, would preserve Presidential authority to issue
additional restrictions, such as an assets freeze. The alternative
interpretations were the subject of discussion at hearings on the
bill before the House Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy.28
Some elements of IEEPA's legislative history clearly appear to
support the more restrictive reading of the grandfather clause.
Testifying before the House Committee on International Rela-

Study in PresidentialPowers, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 149, 162 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV.L. REV. 93, 191 (1981).
25. See Revision of Trading With the Enemy Act: Markup Before the
House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977) (state-

ment of Jonathan Bingham, Chairman, Subcomm. on International Economic
Policy and Trade) [hereinafter cited as Markup].

26. Id.
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (note) (1982).
28. See Markup, supra note 25, at 21-22.
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tions in 1977, C. Fred Bergsten, the Carter Administration's
spokesman for the bill, assured Representative Cavanaugh that
only currently employed "specific uses of authority" would be
grandfathered. 29 He also assured Cavanaugh that authorities included in the TWEA but not currently exercised against a country could not be employed later against that country.3 0 The Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade's deletion
of a broader grandfathering provision also supports a narrow
reading of the ultimate grandfather clause. An early draft preserved authorities already being exercised with respect to a set of
circumstances and "any other authority conferred upon the President by [the TWEA] . . . to deal with the same set of circumstances."'" Preservation of the clause "any other authority" in addition to "authorities currently in use" clearly would have
supported a broad interpretation of the grandfather clause. The
calculated deletion of the clause "any other authority," however,
implies that Congress intended to preserve only specific authorities in use in 1977.32

29. The exchange between Bergsten and Cavanaugh reads as follows:
MR. CAVANAUGH.... Mr. Bergsten, would it be your understanding
that [the grandfather clause] would strictly limit and restrict the
grandfathering of powers ... to those specific uses of authorities granted
in 5(b) being employed as of June 1, 1977.MR. BERGSTEN. Yes, sir.MR.
CAVANAUGH. And it would preclude the expansion by the President of
the authorities that might be included in 5(b) but are not being employed
as of June 1, 1977.MR. BERGSTEN. That is right.
Id. at 21.
30. See id.
31. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3043 (Blackinun, J., dissenting) (quoting Subcommittee Working Draft of June 8, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101(b)).
32. An exchange between Subcommittee Staff Director Roger Majak and
Representative Bingham may indicate that the committee perceived the "current authorities" clause, which survived, as a grandfathering of specific actions
while the "any other authority" clause, which was deleted, was perceived as a
grandfathering of the authority to take specific actions not currently in use.
Majak's explanation of the clause that the committee voted to delete was as
follows:
[W]ith respect to any uses of 5(b) authorities for any presently existing
situation, not only could the President use those particular authorities
that he is now using, but any others which are conferred by section 5(b).
So, if the President is presently using asset controls toward a particular
country, but is not using, let us say, currency controls, he nonetheless
could use, at some later date if he so desired, currency controls with respect to that situation.

984

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:977

Alternatively, other aspects of IEEPA's legislative history support a broader reading of the grandfather clause. The House Report explained that the purpose of the clause was to leave intact
any existing uses of Presidential emergency authority.3 3 Representative Bingham, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Relations, echoed this emphasis on maintaining
all existing emergency authorities by stating that "existing embargoes . . . are not affected in any way by this legislation." 4 In
addition, the Senate Report noted that the grandfather clause
would allow the President to continue to "control transactions
with certain countries."3 5
Although the travel ban to Cuba was abrogated in 1977, both
the'Carter and Reagan Administrations quickly issued regulations
restricting travel to Cuba. The Carter Administration banned
36
trips to Cuba for the purpose of transporting Cuban nationals,
and the Reagan Administration reinstituted a general travel ban
with exceptions for journalists, academics, and relatives of
Cubans.3 7 Adopting the broad interpretation of IEEPA's grandfather clause, both Administrations relied on the TWEA for authority and ignored the procedural mandates of the IEEPA in
promulgating new regulations. Because the Cuban travel ban was
not in effect when the Congress enacted IEEPA, these actions
provided the first tests for the competing interpretations of the
grandfather clause.
Interpreting a clause that partially preserves an otherwise superseded statute is crucial. If the clause is interpreted broadly,
the superseded statute will remain as effective law and-the newly

Hearings, supra note 12, at 167. Because the authority to use asset controls and
the authority to use currency controls apparently were perceived as separate
types of authority, use of only one of these authorities at the time the bill was
enacted would not grandfather the use of the other. An alternate interpretation
would categorize the authority to promulgate sanctions against a country as a
single type of authority. If that authority was being exercised in one manner
(e.g., currency controls) at the time of enactment, it could later be exercised in
another manner (e.g., assets controls). See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1977).
34. 123 CONG. REc. 38,166 (1977).
35. S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4540, 4543.
36. 31 C.F.R. § 515.415(a) (1984). This regulation was issued during the 1980
"freedom flotilla" in which United States boatowners ferried Cuban nationals
from the port of Mariel, Cuba, to destinations in South Florida.
37. See supra note 2.

RECENT DECISIONS

19841

enacted measure loses significance. Both the First Circuit in the
instant case 38 and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Frade,s adhered to the narrow interpretation of the grandfather
clause and invalidated the regulations prohibiting the transport
of Cuban nationals. Thus, in reviewing the instant case, the Supreme Court faced two narrow readings of the grandfather clause
by separate circuit courts.
B. Constitutional Right of Foreign Travel
In Kent v. Dulles,4 ° the Supreme Court first recognized the
right to travel to foreign countries as a liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause. In Kent, the Court struck down the Eisenhower Administration's regulations denying passports to Commu38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. While relying heavily on the
IEEPA's legislative history, the First Circuit also concluded that Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), compelled a narrow reading of the
clause. In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Justice Jackson established a lasting conceptual framework for analyzing challenges to executive
power. While not intended to be rigidly applied, the framework separated uses
of executive power into three categories. In the first category, instances in which
the President acts pursuant to the express or implied will of Congress, his authority is at its maximum. Id. at 635. In the second category, instances in which
the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, the President must rely on powers granted to him by the Constitution. Id. at 637. In the second category there may be a "twilight zone" where the
President and Congress exercise concurrent authority. Id. In the third category,
instances in which the President takes measures contrary to the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its minimum. Id. at 637.
When uses of executive power have been characterized as belonging in the
first category, the actions have been upheld. See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No.
496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 & n.5 (1974); cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 668-69, 675 (1981). Executive actions also have been upheld where
there has been no expansion of congressional will. See, e.g., Chas. T. Main Int'l,
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 813-14 (1st Cir. 1981).
Executive actions contrary to congressional intent have been struck down. See,
e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part,
cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (per curiam).
The First Circuit characterized the instant travel restrictions as belonging in
Justice Jackson's third category. Because the President's power was thus at its
minimum, the statute allegedly authorizing a Presidentially instituted travel ban
should be read narrowly. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 800.
39. 709 F.2d 1387, 1397-1403 (11th Cir. 1983).
40. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). For a discussion of the origins of the right of foreign
travel, see Note, Area Restrictions and the Right to Travel Abroad, 8 U.C.D. L.
REv. 401 (1975).
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nist Party members. The Court held that an individual's right to
travel is a liberty that cannot be denied solely on the basis of
association.41 The Kent Court seemed swayed by the executive
rather than legislative origin of the impediment, implying that
Congress may have greater power to restrict travel.42 Six years
later in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,43 however, the Court invalidated an act of Congress preventing Communists from obtaining passports. The Court essentially held that the Act constituted a denial of liberty without substantive due process because
the restriction was not drawn narrowly enough to prevent the al44
leged evil.

Shortly after the Aptheker decision the Court declined to expand further the trend toward a broader right of foreign travel by
rejecting a challenge to the 1962 regulations banning travel to
Cuba. In Zemel v. Rusk4 5 it reasoned that restrictions based on a
traveler's destination are not as suspect as restrictions based on a
traveler's political association.46 The tension between the United
States and Cuba in the months following the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis constituted a sufficiently rational basis for the Government
to restrict its citizens' liberty to travel to Cuba. The impact of
Zemel was blunted, however, when later decisions refused to uphold criminal sanctions against citizens who traveled to Cuba in
defiance of the ban.47
41. 357 U.S. at 130.
42. Id. at 128.
43. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
44. See id. at 512-14. The decision did not define precise constitutional
grounds for overturning the statute. At the time of the decision, use of substantive due process via Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was out of favor.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 8-1 to 8-7 (1978). Furthermore, use
of the equal protection clause to protect fundamental rights had barely emerged.
See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The 1964
Court thus applied a blurred first amendment freedom of association gloss to aid
what was essentially a fifth amendment substantive due process holding. See
578 U.S. at 508-10. The holding might have been clearer had the case been decided subsequent to the recognition of fundamental rights under the equal protection and due process clauses. See Note, ConstitutionalProtection of Foreign
Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 902, 904-07 & nn.14-28 (1981).
45. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
46. See id. at 14-15.
47. In United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), the Court found no criminal violation under the Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982), or the

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1982), after 58
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have followed Zemel's refusal
to apply a strict level of scrutiny to laws that inhibit an individual's right to travel abroad. Califano v. Aznavorian s considered a
challenge to Social Security Act amendments that eliminated disability benefits during periods when an otherwise eligible recipient is abroad for more than thirty days. The Court noted that the
restrictions did not have as strong an impact on foreign travel as
the passport restrictions at issue in Zemel and Aptheker, and
held that the problems in monitoring recipient needs abroad provided a rational basis for the Act's chilling effect on foreign
travel.49 Most recently, a former CIA agent who had purposely
exposed fellow agents brought suit to contest the State Department's revocation of his passport on grounds of national security.
The Court, in Haig v. Agee, 50 held that national security interests
provided an adequate basis for restricting the former agent's
movements abroad. The Court distinguished Aptheker on the basis that the agent's actions in the case before it were a proven
danger while in Aptheker Communist Party membership could
not support a presumption of danger. 51 Nevertheless, Haig reveals
a current tendency to construe the travel rights defined in
Aptheker as narrowly as possible.
Taken togeth6r, the foreign travel cases appear to apply a strict
level of scrutiny only to travel restrictions that inhibit the exercise of an individual's first amendment rights. The cases do not
indicate a willingness to expand the right of foreign travel to instances in which travel rights restrictions are not accompanied by
restrictions on the exercise of more "traditional" constitutional
rights. In the instant decision the Court faced for the first time a
United States citizens travelled to Cuba without passports validated for that
purpose. Because the Immigration Act only speaks of the need of a passport for
entering or leaving the United States, id. § 1185(b), the Court recognized no
criminal prohibition against entering Cuba without a passport or against entering Cuba from countries other than the United States. 385 U.S. at 481-82.
Shortly after Laub, an individual who had traveled to North Vietnam in defiance of a State Department prohibition sought to enjoin the State Department
from revoking his passport. Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The
District of Columbia Circuit held that the issuance of a passport could be conditioned on not taking the passport into a given country, but it could not be conditioned on a promise not to travel to that country. Id. at 945-47.
48. 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
49. Id. at 177.
50. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
51. Id. at 305-06.
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challenge to travel restrictions that did not concurrently discriminate in violation of an individual's fundamental rights.
III.

INSTANT DECISION

In construing the proper scope of IEEPA's preservation of
Presidential authorities, the Court 2 relied on IEEPA's legislative
history supporting a broad reading of the Act's grandfather
clause. Based on evidence that the drafters did not intend the
grandfather clause to affect existing embargoes or to create controversy, 53 the Court refused to interpret the clause to require
that an emergency be declared before changing United States policy toward Cuba. The Court also noted that both the statute and
the legislative history consistently refer to the grandfathering of
"authorities" rather than the grandfathering of "prohibitions" or
specific "restrictions.""' Because the ordinary meaning of the
term "authorities" seems to refer to the power to create restrictions, the Court reasoned that in preserving "authorities," Congress intended to preserve the President's power to create further
restrictions. 5 5 Thus, the President's authority to regulate contacts
between the United States and Cuba was being exercised in some
form56 on the date set by the grandfather clause, and the Court
held that the President could extend that authority to declare a
ban on travel to Cuba.
The Court then turned to the constitutional issue and acknowledged a citizen's right to travel abroad under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 57 Although this right, as established by Kent and Aptheker, had prevented the state from burdening a person's ability to travel abroad on the basis of individual political beliefs, the Court noted that Zemel had upheld
52. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
53. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3037 (1984) (quoting Rep. Bingham). See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
54. 104 S. Ct. at 3036-37.
55. Id. at 3036 & n.21.
56. The Court noted that although most forms of travel to Cuba were permitted on July 1, 1977, certain travel-related restrictions were in effect on that
date. Scheduled air and sea travel to Cuba from points in the United States
were banned, and individuals traveling to Cuba were required to keep a record
of all expenses. Id. at 3031 n.6, 3034. Because these regulations were in place on
July 1, 1977, the President was exercising his authority to regulate travel to
Cuba on that date.

57. Id. at 3038.
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universal application of travel area restrictions. Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish Zemel, which the Court had decided during the missile crisis era of heightened tension between the
United States and Cuba. Plaintiffs argued that the tension which
had provided the rational basis for burdening foreign travel in
Zemel no longer existed. 8 The instant Court, however, found that
Cuba's current economic and military backing of armed violence
abroad59 provided an adequate basis for continued restrictions on
travel to Cuba. Furthermore, the travel ban was a sufficiently rational means for preventing the flow of hard currency to a nation
that funds terrorist activity in the Western Hemisphere.6
The four dissenting justices 61 relied on evidence supporting a
restrictive reading of the grandfather clause and argued that the
President's actions were precluded by statute. Therefore, they did
not reach the constitutional issue. The dissent argued that the
drafters intended the savings clause to grandfather only specific
prohibitions in place on the specified date because a clause that
would have grandfathered currently unused authorities had been
eliminated at the subcommittee stage.62 The dissent also noted
that the Administration's sponsor for the bill at the time of its
passage had assured Representatives that only currently em-

58. Id. at 3039.
59. The Court relied on a declaration by Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in reaching the conclusion that Cuba's
promotion of foreign revolutions poses a significant danger to the United States.
Id.

60. The Court reasoned that hard currency brought into Cuba by travelers
could be used to finance Cuba's military adventurism abroad. Id.
61. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. Id. at 3040 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The Court used an exchange
between Rep. Bingham and Leonard E.Santos, a Treasury Department attorney, to discount the importance of the deletion of the second part of the grandfather clause. Mr. Santos stated that the President was already exercising all of
his authorities under section 5(b) of the TWEA; therefore, it was unnecessary to
grandfather authorities not already being used. The Court asserted that the
clause may have been deleted as surplusage. 104 S.Ct. at 3036 n.20. The dissent
was not persuaded by the Court's attempt to minimize the significance of the
deletion. The dissent stated that it was "nonsensical to assume that Mr. Santos
meant, or that Representative Bingham could have understood him to mean,
that all § 5(b) powers were being exercised with respect to the countries that
were currently the subject of regulations promulgated under § 5(b)." Id. at 3044
n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent found Santos' statement to be too
"ambiguous and confusing" to affect the "clear import of the deletion." Id.
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ployed "specific uses of authorities" would be grandfathered.6 3
Last, although the majority looked to the ordinary meaning of the
term "authority" in interpreting the grandfather clause, the dissent looked to the statute's general purpose to restrict the use of
Presidential emergency authorities to true emergency situations.6 4
Hence, the dissent would have held that because the travel ban
was not a specific use of authority in place on July 1, 1977, the
President was obligated to follow IEEPA's procedural requirements before instituting the travel restrictions. 5
IV. COMMENT
The instant case may signal a waning of the narrow emergency
executive authorities instituted by IEEPA and a reemergence of
the broad powers established by the TWEA. Both Dames &
Moore and the instant case show a willingness to interpret
IEEPA's restrictions to favor unfettered Presidential authority.6
In order to find authority for the President's actions, the Court
forsook the supportable narrow reading of IEEPA's grandfather
clause that was preferred by the First and Eleventh Circuits, 7
and by the dissenters in the instant case. Considering the Supreme Court's traditional deference to the President in foreign
policy matters, 8 the willingness of four justices to challenge the
President casts doubt upon the Presidential action.
The majority's strained deference to the President has several
63. Id. at 3044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
64. 104 S. Ct. at 3045 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 3049.
66. Dames & Moore permitted the President to nullify attachments on assets
and transfer the assets to a foreign bank despite the deletion from the IEEPA of
the President's power to "vest" property. See supra note 24. The instant case
and Dames & Moore may indicate that the Court will go to some lengths to
minimize the effect of other IEEPA restrictions that have not yet been tested.
The TEEPA removed the President's powers to seize records and regulate purely
domestic transactions. See H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 33, at 13. These are
important restrictions that the Court may interpret to favor the President.
67. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
68. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936) ("[W]e are here dealing [with] . . . the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress ...
"). See generally L. TRINE, supra note 44, §§ 42 to 4-3.
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unsettling implications. First, the instant Court's broad reading of
the grandfather clause may allow the President free rein in dealing with some countries while remaining restrictions limit his
powers with regard to other countries. For example, after the instant decision, the President need not heed IEEPA when dealing
with Cuba, China,69 Vietnam, North Korea-countries with which
the United States relations have stabilized or improved in recent
years but which were the subject of emergency actions in 1977. By
contrast, the President must follow IEEPA when taking actions
against Afghanistan, Poland, or Libya-countries not subject to
emergency actions on July 1, 197770 but where recent events have
required more immediate executive action than any in the former,
exempt nations.7 1 There seems to be no valid policy reason to distinguish between the two groups of countries when interpreting
the scope of the President's power to conduct United States foreign relations.
Second, resolving the statutory question in favor of the'President also may upset the Constitutional balance of executive and
legislative power set forth by Justice Jackson in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 2 Justice Jackson posited that a
President's power is at its lowest ebb when exercised against the
express or implied will of Congress. 7 ' Under Justice Jackson's
69. Presidentially imposed restrictions on trade with China were relaxed in
1971, Relaxation of Controls on Current Transactions with the Peoples Republic
of China, 36 C.F.R. §§ 500.545-.547 (1972), but a freeze on Chinese assets was
still in effect on July 1, 1977. Because the President was exercising some authority with regard to China on that date, his power to issue further regulations
concerning China might be preserved under the Court's reading of the grandfather clause. The instant decision, therefore, apparently would permit the President to institute far reaching sanctions against China, including a total trade
and travel ban, without declaring an emergency or consulting with Congress
under the IEEPA. See Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3048 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Under the Senate Report on the IEEPA the grandfather clause
would not permit an expansion of the freeze on Chinese assets. See S. Rep. No.
466, supra note 35, at 4. The instant Court, however, did not give credence to
that portion of the Senate Report. See 104 S. Ct. at 3048 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
70. See 104 S. Ct. at 3047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the aerial conflict
between United States and Libyan fighters in July 1981, and the imposition of
martial law in Poland in December 1981, were three recent foreign crises that
elicited prompt executive responses.
72. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
73. See supra note 38.
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analysis, a statute enacted to limit Presidential power should not
be interpreted with a presumption in favor of the President. The
Court, therefore, appears to defy Justice Jackson's approach by
74
straining to interpret IEEPA in favor of the President.
Last, the instant decision limits the fifth amendment right of
foreign travel established in Kent and Aptheker. When compared
with the three previous Supreme Court decisions that have upheld restrictions on foreign travel, the rational basis offered by
the majority in the instant decision is relatively weak.7 5 In particular, the rational basis in Zemel for upholding travel restrictions
to Cuba just months after the missile crisis was far stronger than
the basis for such restrictions decades later in 1984. Furthermore,
the travel ban does not bear a close relationship to its apparent
goal of inhibiting the funding of Cuban adventurism. For example, the need to limit Cuba's access to hard currency has not deterred the Administration from permitting 42,500 Americans to
bring cash into Cuba under exceptions for journalists, academics,
and relatives of Cubans.7 6 Thus, regulations that restrict the relatively few people who wish to travel to Cuba for other reasons
bear a very tenuous relationship to the goal of preventing the flow
of currency to Cuba. The refusal to apply more than perfunctory
scrutiny in the instant case suggests that the Court will not strike
down future restraints on foreign travel except under circumstances where, as in Aptheker, the restraints are based on an individual's political affiliations. It is unlikely that Congress will be
able to overcome the instant Court's reluctance to find a firm constitutional basis for the right to travel abroad as long as the Court

74. See Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1983).
75. The three prior cases are Zemel, Agee, and Aznavorian. In Zemel, a
stronger rational basis existed for banning travel to Cuba in 1962, when Cuba
was on the brink of war with the United States, than at the time of the instant
case. A strong rational basis also existed in Agee: the need to restrict the movements of a former CIA agent who had a proven history of exposing covert operations. In Aznavorian, the difficulties of administering disability programs abroad
were sufficient to justify a minor burden on foreign travel. See supra notes 45-51
and accompanying text. The instant case, therefore, arguably presented the least
compelling rational basis for a heavy burden on foreign travel.
76. Since 1982, 40,000 people have traveled to Cuba under the family exception, and 2,500 have visited under the journalism and research exception. Lewis,
Big Brother Says No, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at A19, col. 1.
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will interpret legislation to favor broad Presidential authority to
impose travel restraints.
Jonathan F. Mack

JURISDICTION

BANK MAY NOT ASSERT ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE AS DEFENSE IN ACTION ON CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.

Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.
1984).
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff Garcia, a Cuban citizen prior to the Cuban revolution,
sued' Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) to recover payment on two
certificates of deposit 2 issued by Chase's Cuban branch in
Vedado. Garcia and her late husband 3 had purchased the certificates of deposit in 1958. Prior to their purchase, the depositors
had expressed concern for the safety of their money because of
the uncertain political climate then existing in Cuba.4 Chase officials had assured them that Chase's New York office would guar1. Plaintiff, Juanita Gonzalez Garcia, originally brought suit in the federal
district court in Puerto Rico. The suit was transferred to a federal district court
in New York pursuant to the venue provision of the banking title to the United
States Code. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 647-48 (2d
Cir. 1984). The provision states that any action against a national bank may be
brought in the federal district in which the bank's principal place of business is
located. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1982).
2. When a bank receives a sum of money for deposit that the bank promises
to pay to the depositor at a specified later date, the bank's written acknowledgment of its receipt of the deposit is called a certificate of deposit. The transaction between the bank and the depositor creates a debtor-creditor relationship
between the two parties. The certificate of deposit represents a loan by the depositor to the bank. Garcia,735 F.2d at 649. See generally 5B MICHIE ON BANKS
AND BANKING § 313 (1983). Because a certificate of deposit is payable at a time
stipulated by the bank and the depositor, the certificate usually includes the
date that it first becomes payable by the bank. Technically, the certificate of
deposit is due when the depositor makes a demand for payment. Id. § 326a.
Garcia and her late husband had purchased one certificate of deposit for 100,000
pesos, payable on March 10, 1959. They later had purchased another for 400,000
pesos, payable on March 16, 1959. 735 F.2d at 646-47.
3. Plaintiff's husband, Jose Lorenzo Perez Dominguez, was a wealthy businessman and retired Cuban army colonel. Id. at 646.
4. Acting on the recommendation of a friend, Garcia and Dominguez had
negotiated the purchase at Chase's Cuban branch bank in Vedado. Two Chase
officials, responding to Dominguez's concern for his money, had explained that
the deposit would be a private contract between the bank and the depositors
and had assured him that the certificates of deposit would act as insurance for
his money. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646.
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antee the certificates and that the depositors could present the
certificates for payment at any one of Chase's worldwide branch
banks. 5 After taking power in early 1959, the revolutionary Cuban
Government had issued a decree freezing bank accounts in general' and later, by specific order, had closed the couple's certificate of deposit account.7 In compliance with the orders, Chase
had paid the Cuban Government the value of the two certificates." In 1960 Chase's Cuban branches were nationalized and
their assets and liabilities were assumed by the National Bank of
Cuba.9
Garcia initiated the instant action following her husband's
death in 1975.10 Chase defended by arguing that its debt to Garcia effectively had been cancelled when, prior to Garcia's presentment of the certificates for payment, the Cuban Government had
closed Garcia's account and forced Chase to pay the value of the
deposits." The bank argued further that the act of state doctrine
precluded the court from examining the validity of the Cuban
Government's actions. Unpersuaded by Chase's arguments, the
district court upheld the jury's verdict that Chase was liable to

5. The couple had purchased the certificates of deposit with pesos. Chase
officials, however, had stated that repayment made in New York would be made
in United States dollars because dollars were the currency used by the bank.
During this time, pesos had been equal in value to dollars. Id.
6. Cuban Law No. 78, enacted in February 1959, provided in part:
Article 5. The Minister [of Recovery of Misappropriated Property] shall
decree the precautionary measures which may be necessary in order to assure the purpose pursued by this Law, and particularly the following:
a) the freezing of bank accounts, the sealing and opening of safe deposit
boxes in banks or in other private institutions.
735 F.2d at 647 n.1.
7. The order authorizing the closing of the couple's account was dated July
16, 1959. 735 F.2d at 647.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.

10. Although Dominguez left Cuba shortly after the revolution, Garcia did
not leave Cuba until 1964. Prior to his death,Pominguez had inquired through
Chase's branch bank in Madrid regarding the' status of the certificates of deposit. Chase had reported the actions taken by the Cuban Government and had
suggested that Dominguez address further inquiries to the National Bank of
Cuba. After Dominguez's death, Garcia found the certificates of deposit in Dominguez's safety deposit box. Through written correspondence, Chase responded
to Garcia's inquiry regarding the status of the certificates by referring Garcia to
the National Bank of Cuba. Id. at 647.
11. Id. at 649.
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the plaintiff for the amount of the deposit. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirmed. Held: When
pursuant to private agreement a bank issues certificates of deposit to protect its customer's money, but subsequently pays the
value of the certificates to a third party foreign government, the
act of state doctrine does not shield the bank from liability to its
customer who retains possession of the certificates of deposit.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The act of state doctrine provides that United States courts
will not examine the validity of the acts of a foreign government
that occur within that government's own territory. 1 2 The Supreme
Court first articulated the doctrine in 1897 in Underhill v. Hernandez,1 3 and initially applied it to disputes stemming from a foreign government's confiscation of personal property within its
borders. In Oetjen v.Central Leather Co.,' 4 the Court ruled that

12. The act of state doctrine has been summarized as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by statute or the [rule] stated in ... § 43, a
court in the United States, having jurisdiction... to determine a claim
asserted against a person in the United States or with respect to a thing
located there, or other interest localized there, will refrain from examining
the validity of an act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised
its jurisdiction to give effects to its public interests.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
(1965). Rule 43 provides in part:
(1) The rule stated in § 41 does not prevent examination of the validity of
an act of a foreign state with respect to a thing located, or an interest
localized, outside of its territory if the act has not been fully executed in
accordance with applicable law.
Id. § 43 (emphasis added). For a discussion of application of the act of state
doctrine to limit the liability of banks for deposits in their foreign branches, see
Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 903, 950-73 (1979).
13. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Underhill, a United States citizen brought suit
against the leader of a revolutionary army in Venezuela to recover damages for
his forced detention there and for assaults made on him by soldiers of the Venezuelan army. Because the acts of the defendant occurred within Venezuela and
were considered the acts of the Venezuelan Government, the Court concluded
that United States courts had no jurisdiction to review their validity. The Court
emphasized that each state must respect the sovereignty of all other states and
that the courts of one sovereign state or government must not sit in judgment on
the acts of any other sovereign state or government when the disputed acts occur within the territorial limits of the other sovereign state. See id. at 252.
14. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
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the act of state doctrine did not allow United States courts to
reexamine a Mexican revolutionary leader's confiscation and subsequent sale of certain animal hides because these acts were acts
of the Mexican Government.1 5 In a companion case, Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 1 6 the Court refused to examine the validity
of the Mexican Government's confiscation and subsequent resale
of lead bullion. 17 Instead, it accepted the Mexican Government's
action as a policy decision and restated its Underhill ruling that
United States courts may not sit in judgment on the validity of

acts of a foreign government conducted within its own territory.""
In its 1964 decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,19
the Court outlined what has become the current judicial approach
to legal disputes arising from the acts of a foreign sovereign. The
Court ruled that in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement reflecting controlling legal principles, the judiciary
would not examine the validity of the Cuban Government's expropriation 20 of the assets of a Cuban corporation within its own
territory that were the subject of contract with a United States
commodities broker, 2' even if the confiscation violated international law.22

15. Id. at 303-04. The Mexican revolutionary military leader had confiscated
the animal hides from a Mexican business as compensation for a mandatory military contribution and later sold the hides to a Texas corporation. The assignee
of the Mexican business then sued the Texas corporation to recover the hides.
Id. at 299-300.

16. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
17. The plaintiff was a United States corporation that had purchased the
bullion prior to its confiscation. The defendant had purchased the bullion from
the Mexican Government. Id. at 305-06.
18. Id. at 309.

19. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
20. Cuban Law No. 851 nationalized all property in Cuba in which United
States citizens owned any interest. Cuba enacted the law in response to a United
States statute that ordered a reduction of the import quota for Cuban sugar.
Sabbatino, at 401 & n.3.
21. After its confiscation of the corporation's assets, the Cuban Government
forced the United States broker to enter into new contracts to buy sugar from
the Government. The broker signed the new contracts to obtain delivery of the
sugar shipment, which was then in Cuban territorial waters on its way to'the
United States. See Heininger, supra note 12, at 950-52. When the broker later
refused to pay on the new contracts, a Cuban Government agent sued in district
court to recover payment for the sugar.
22. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court concluded that although the expropriation of
the Cuban corporation was offensive to United States public policy, the act of
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The Supreme Court first applied the act of state doctrine to
disputes over bank transactions in its 1937 decision, United
States v. Belmont.2" The Soviet Government had dissolved a private Russian corporation and expropriated its assets, subsequently assigning the corporation's deposits with a New York
banker to the United States Government.2 4 The Court ruled that
the act of state doctrine precluded judicial examination of the legality of the Soviet Government's action. 25 The district court had
held that the disputed bank deposit was property located in the
State of New York and not an intangible property right located
within Soviet territory.2 6 To recognize the assignment, therefore,
would effectively confiscate property and violate the public policy
of the State of New York. In reversing the lower court decision
the Supreme Court did not decide the situs of the debt, but held
that New York's public policy did not override an effective international agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Therefore, the United States held indisputable legal title
to the deposit because the act of state doctrine prohibited the
defendant's challenge to the validity of the assignment.28
Although the Belmont Court focused only on the validity of the
Soviet assignment to the United States, courts generally determine the location of the confiscated property before deciding
whether the act of state doctrine will apply. The initial inquiry is
necessary because the act of state doctrine applies only when the
property is located within the territory of the foreign govern-

state doctrine nonetheless applied in the case. Id. at 436-37. See generally Comment, The Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and Public International Law, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1278 (1962).
23. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
24. Id. at 326. The United States Government sued Belmont to recover the
deposit. Id. at 325-26.
25. Id. at 328.
26. Id. at 327. Presumably, the district court believed that the act of state
doctrine did not apply because the doctrine precluded the court's review of the
validity of the foreign government's acts only when the acts occurred within the
foreign country.
27. The Court found that the assignment of the Russian corporation's assets,
together with other agreements between the United States and Soviet Governments, was a single transaction resulting in an international agreement with a
foreign government that also recognized the validity of the acts of the foreign
government. See id. at 330.
28. Id. at 332.
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ment.29 Courts can easily determine the situs of real property or
tangible property, such as the animal hides in Qejtan and the
lead bullion in Ricaud. Deciding the location of intangible property,30 however, is much more difficult. Courts generally equate
the location of intangible property with the location of its owner
because a debt is an intangible property right of the debtor. In
Harris v. Balk,31 for example, the Supreme Court held that the
situs of a debt is wherever the debtor may be found.2
In Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank,33 the Second
Circuit applied the general rule for intangibles to a dispute resulting from a foreign sovereign's attempted confiscation of property
located within the United States. The court held that the Iraqi
Government's attempt to confiscate the former King of Iraq's
United States bank account was valid only if the act was consistent with United States law and policy.34 Eight years later in lenendez v. Saks & Co.,3 5 the Second Circuit applied the reasoning

of Republic of Iraq, explaining that pursuant to the act of state
doctrine, a debt is located outside of the foreign state unless that
state has the power to enforce or collect the debt.36 The court
thus held that the act of state doctrine did not protect a foreign

29.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 43 (1965).
30. Intangible property is defined as property without intrinsic or marketable value but with representative or evidentiary value for such items as certificates of stock, bonds, promissory notes and certificates of deposit. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 726 (5th ed. 1979).
31. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
32. Id. at 222. The stated objective of the rule was to prevent the debtor
from having to pay the same debt twice. Id. at 226.

33. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
34. 353 F.2d at 51. Subsequent to the King's death in Iraq, the new Government of Iraq issued a decree confiscating all property of the former King, including a bank account and stock held by The Irving Trust Company in New York.
Although the Iraqi Government notified Irving Trust of its claim to the former
King's property, the bank transferred the property to the defendant administrator of the former King's estate. Id. at 50.
35. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). In Menendez,
Cuban interventors, who had acquired interests in Cuban cigar companies after
the expropriation of the companies by the Cuban Government, attempted to
recover payments for cigar shipments from United States importers. The original owners of the cigar companies also asserted claims against the payments for
the cigar shipments. Id. at 1360-61.
36. 485 F.2d at 1364.

19841

RECENT DECISIONS

state's attempted seizure of debts owed by persons outside the
territorial limits of the foreign state.37 The two Second Circuit
decisions demonstrate the consistent refusal of United States
courts to apply the act of state doctrine to the3 confiscation
of ex8
governments.
foreign
by
property
traterritorial
In addition to the territorial limits upon its application, the act
of state doctrine is subject to certain exceptions. In French v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba,39 for example, a New York appellate
court reviewed the exception established by the Hickenlooper
Amendment, 40 which requires United States courts to settle

claims to property confiscated by foreign governments in violation
of principles of international law. The court found that the claim
by a United States citizen who had acquired bank certificates
from a Cuban bank, which later refused to honor the certificates
in exchange for United States dollars, did not constitute a confiscation of property by a foreign government. Because the court
found the Cuban Government's action was a breach of contract
and not a confiscation of property in violation of international
law, the court concluded that the Hickenlooper Amendment did
not preclude application of the act of state doctrine.4 '

37. Id. at 1364-65.
38. See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir.
1976) (doctrine not applicable to claims of Bangladesh Government to balance
due on goods shipped to New York by East Pakistani corporation prior to its
expropriation); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972) (doctrine not applicable to claim of Cuban
Government to trademark registered with the United States Patent Office and
owned by expropriated Cuban brewery); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v.
Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968)
(doctrine not applicable to claim of interventor, appointed by Cuban Government to run expropriated Cuban corporation, to payments owed by United
States corporation for prior tobacco shipments).
39. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
40. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982). Enacted in 1964 in response to the Sabbatino decision, the Hickenlooper Amendment was intended to apply to any
claims of title or other right to property based upon a confiscation or taking
after January 1, 1959, by an act of state in violation of principles of interna-'
tional law. See Heininger, supra note 12, at 953-54 & n.223. See generally Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 175, 178-83 (1967).
41. French, 23 N.Y.2d at 62, 242 N.E.2d at 715, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 448-49. After reviewing a Senate report, the French court concluded that Congress intended banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions to use the
act of state doctrine as a defense to multiple liability on any contract, deposit, or
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United States courts generally have refused to apply the act of
state doctrine to suits arising from the expropriation of bank deposits by foreign governments. In Russek v. Angulo, 42 decided in
1921, a Texas state court granted recovery to a Mexican citizen
whose certificate of deposit issued by private Mexican bankers
had been expropriated by the revolutionary Mexican Government. The defendant bankers argued that when they paid the
Mexican Government the amount of the deposit, they were relieved of any further obligation to the certificate holder. Moreover, because the payment had been made in response to a formal
decree by the Mexican Government, 3 the defendants contended
that the expropriation was an act of state, immune from examination in United States courts. Although the Mexican Government
had not presented the certificate of deposit in exchange for payment, it had authorized the bankers to retain the certificate with4
out making additional payment upon any later presentation.
The court ruled, nevertheless, that the Mexican Government's act
did not relieve the bankers from liability to the owner of the certificate of deposit because the Government had confiscated property owned by the bankers.45 The court found the following facts
significant to its holding: (1) the Mexican Government had confiscated the certificate of deposit prior to the date it was payable to
the owner;46 (2) the bankers had merely paid their own funds to
the Mexican Government because the certificate had created a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bankers and the owner; 47

insurance policy expropriated by a foreign government. Id. at 61, 242 N.E.2d at
714, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
42. 236 S.W. 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
43. See id. at 132. The Mexican Government asserted that the owner of the
certificate of deposit was a political enemy. When the bankers refused initially
to pay on the deposit because the money was in a Texas bank, the Mexican
Government threatened to imprison them. The bankers then obtained the
money from the Texas bank and paid it to the Government. Id. at 133.

44. Id.
45. The court implied that the act of state doctrine would, in a proper case,
preclude the court's examination of a foreign government's confiscation of the
property of one of its citizens. See id.
46. Although the Mexican Government on May 8, 1920, demanded payment
on Angulo's deposit with the bankers, the certificates of deposit did not become
payable to Angulo until June 13, 1920. Id. at 132-33.
47. The court rejected testimony by Mexican lawyers who argued that, subsequent to confiscation of the certificates, the private bankers would not be liable for the certificates under Mexican law. Id. at 134; see also supra note 2.
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and (3) the bankers never introduced into evidence the Mexican
statute that allegedly extinguished their liability on the debt.48
Although Russek has not been expressly overruled, the unusual
factual situation and the court's implication that the act of state
doctrine might otherwise have applied49 limit the decision's precedential value. No court outside of Texas had cited it as authority
prior to the instant decision.50
Similarly, in Sokoloff v. National City Bank,51 another early
decision, a New York state court enforced a New York bank's liability to a Russian citizen on a deposit account opened in the
bank's New York offices but maintained at the bank's Russian
branch. The Soviet Government had issued decrees expropriating
the assets of the Russian branch and later confiscated the accounts of its depositors.5 2 The court ruled that the expropriation
was not protected by recognized principles of international law
because at the time the United States did not officially recognize
the Soviet Government." The court therefore concluded that acts
of the unrecognized Soviet Government did not release the bank
from liability for the funds in the depositor's account or for funds
that the bank failed to transfer for the depositor.54
In a more recent decision, Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 55 the Second Circuit found a New York bank liable
for deposit accounts maintained by Vietnamese corporations and
48. See supra note 45.
49. Russek, 236 S.W. at 134.
50. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 652, 236 S.W.2d 779,
790-91 (1951); Barreda v. Milmo Nat'l Bank, 241 S.W. 743, 749 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922). See generally Comment, InternationalLaw-The Effect Upon Private
Property Rights of the Acts and Decrees of Revolutionary Governments and
Revolutionary Factions, 41 TExx L. REv. 226, 230 (1926).
51. 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928).
52. The depositor had requested the Russian branch to transfer funds to a
second account in the depositor's name located in another Russian city, but the
bank, without notifying the depositor, failed to make the transfer. Id. at 79, 164
N.E. at 749. The bank later was unable to determine the status of the transfer
because the revolutionary Soviet Government, by a decree issued on December
17, 1917, merged all Russian banks with its State Bank. See Heininger, supra
note 12, at 928. By a later decree, the Soviet Government also confiscated the
accounts of the bank depositors. Id. at 929.
53. Sokoloff, 250 N.Y. at 80, 164 N.E. at 749. The new Soviet Government
was not recognized by the United States until November 16, 1933. See Heininger, supra note 12, at 928.
54. See Sokoloff, 250 N.Y. at 80-81, 164 N.E. at 748-49.
55. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
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a certificate of deposit held by a Vietnamese private citizen. The
disputed deposit agreements had been negotiated with Chase's
Saigon branch.5 6 Anticipating the city's capture by communist armies, Chase had closed its Saigon branch in April 1975 without
prior notice to depositors.57 On May 1, 1975, the new communist
government had issued a decree that confiscated industrial and
commercial establishments in Vietnam, including all banks.
Chase argued that the assets of its corporate depositors, including
the plaintiffs' bank accounts, had been confiscated.5 8 The court,
however, rejected this contention because the expropriation order
included only the physical assets of the corporate depositors and
failed to affect the debts Chase owed its depositors.5 9 Emphasizing that Chase had abandoned its banking operations and terminated its separate corporate identity in Saigon before the May
1975 decree,6" the court concluded that when the expropriation
decree was issued the deposits no longer existed in Vietnam. The
court, therefore, followed the general rule that the situs of the
debt is the situs of the debtor, 6 ' and found that by its confiscation
the Vietnamese Government could not have enforced payment of
the deposit accounts because it retained no jurisdiction over
Chase. 2 Consequently, the Second Circuit rejected application of
the act of state doctrine as a defense and concluded that Chase's
own act, the abandonment of its Saigon branch, had converted
63
the bank deposits into extraterritorial property.

56. The corporate plaintiffs had maintained deposit accounts denominated
in Vietnamese piastres at Chase's Saigon branch. Another plaintiff, a
Vietnamese citizen, had purchased a six-month certificate of deposit for two
hundred million piastres payable on May 27, 1975. Id. at 856-57.
57. Id. at 857. Following a determination by officials in Chase's New York
offices that Saigon would soon fall to the Communists, Chase terminated its operations at the Saigon branch. Chase, therefore, could not pay the certificate of
deposit to the plaintiff Vietnamese citizen at its Saigon branch when the certificate subsequently matured. See supra note 56.
58. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 862.
59. A Vietnamese law expert testified to the interpretation of the printed
text of a radio broadcast announcing the confiscation of maritime transportation
facilities and determined that the confiscation reached the bank accounts of the

depositors. The court, however, determined that the plain meaning of the statement indicated confiscation of physical assets only. Id. at 861-62.

60. Id. at 862.
61. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
62. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 862.
63. See id. Based on its finding that the certificate of deposit issued by the
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On facts similar to those of the instant decision, a New York
state court held in Perez v. Chase ManhattanBank, N.A.,64 that
the Cuban Government's confiscation of a Cuban national's account with the bank's Cuban branch relieved the bank of further
liability to the depositor. The plaintiff,65 the wife of a former Cuban Government official, had purchased five certificates of deposit
from Chase's branch in a suburb of Havana. After the Cuban
Government confiscated the deposits, the depositor presented her
certificates and demanded payment. 66 The court determined that

the act of state doctrine precluded examination of the Cuban
Government's confiscation and that the confiscation order negated Chase's liability to the depositor.67 Important to the court's
determination were the following findings: (1) the situs of the
debt was in Cuba because Chase's Cuban branches conducted
normal operations at the time of the confiscation; (2) although
Chase's debt to the depositor was payable at any of Chase's
branches outside of Cuba, the certificates of deposit also were
payable in Cuba; and (3) in accordance with the general rule regarding the situs of intangible property,68 the Cuban Government
had the power to collect the debt on the certificates of deposit,
which were within Cuban territory. 9 Because the certificates were
within Cuba and the depositor was a Cuban citizen, the court determined that a confiscation by the Cuban Government of property owned by one of its own citizens did not violate principles of
Saigon branch had not matured on the date Chase ceased its Saigon operations,
see supra notes 56-57, the court stated that the depositor was entitled to assert
its claim on the certificate against the home office of the bank. The court reasoned that the situs of the deposit accounts was at Chase's New York home"
office once Chase no longer operated its Saigon branch. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at
862-63; see Heininger, supra note 12, at 975.
64. 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
366 (1984).
65. The bank depositor, now deceased, was the former Rosa Manas y Pineiro. The action was brought before the court in the name of Esther G. M.
Perez, administratrix of the estate of the bank depositor. Id. at 465, 463 N.E.2d
at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
66. The depositor initially demanded payment on the certificates of deposit,
which were payable in 1959, at Chase's New York office in January 1974. The
depositor then resided in the United States. Id. at 465-67, 463 N.E.2d at 6-7, 474
N.Y.S.2d at 690-91.
67. Id. at 473, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
68. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
69. See Perez, N.Y.2d at 469-71, 463 N.E.2d at 8-9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 692-93.

1006

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 17:995

international law. Consequently, the Perez court concluded that
71
0
the Hickenlooper Amendment" did not preclude judicial review.
Contrary to the state court's decision in Perez, in the instant case
the Second Circuit adopted the position taken by the courts in
Russek, Sokoloff, and Vishipco, and refused to apply the act of
state doctrine to a foreign government's confiscation of a bank
account.

III.

THE INSTANT DECISION

The court of appeals initially determined that the New York
statute of limitations did not bar plaintiff's claim. 2 The court
then considered Chase's argument that the Cuban Government
had relieved it of liability by closing the account and expropriating the equivalent amount of funds from the bank, thereby cancelling the debt on the certificates of deposit.7 3 Chase asserted
further that the act of state doctrine prevented the court's examination of the validity of the Cuban Government's actions. 4 The
court, however, rejected Chase's assertions and ruled that Chase
had paid the Cuban Government from its own funds because the
funds had not been set aside specifically for Garcia's deposit account.7 5 Relying on Russek, the court concluded that forced payment of an equivalent sum of Chase's own funds did not extinguish Chase's debt to Garcia.7 6 The court noted that a bank
cannot be forced to pay a certificate of deposit unless the certificate is presented to the bank when payment is demanded. 77 It
reasoned that Chase had acted at its own peril by paying the
funds to the Cuban Government when the Government had not

70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
71. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 472, 463 N.E.2d at 10, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
72. Garcia,735 F.2d at 648. The court rejected Chase's argument that the six
year limitations period started when Chase "repudiated" the debt owed to the
plaintiff. Id. Chase contended that letters sent to Dominguez and Garcia in 1964
and 1968, advising them that the Cuban Government had confiscated the deposit accounts, operated as an unequivocal repudiation of its liability on the certificates of deposit. Id.
73. Id. at 649.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. The court argued by analogy that a gunman's demand to Chase to pay a
sum equivalent to Garcia's debt clearly would not extinguish Chase's debt to
Garcia. Id.

77.

Id. (citing 5B

MIcHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING

§ 326a (1983)).
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presented the certificates."
The court next discussed its rationale for finding the act of
state doctrine inapplicable. Although the court conceded that the
Cuban Government validly could seize Chase's debt to Garcia if
the situs of the debt were in Cuba, it stated that had the debt
been seized it still would have ruled in Garcia's favor. 9 In the
court's opinion, Garcia entered an agreement with Chase to ensure that she would receive payment on the certificates of deposit
regardless of intervening events. Relying on Vishipco, the court
concluded that Chase had "accepted the risk that it would be liable elsewhere" for the debt incurred by its Cuban branch.80 It emphasized that Chase had agreed to honor the certificates of deposit at any of its branches."1 Although the court predicated its
decision on Chase's contractual agreement to ensure the safety of
Garcia's money, it noted that its decision was consistent with the
policy considerations underlying the act of state doctrine.82 Because the dispute at issue in the case was between a United
States bank and its depositor, the court ruled that its resolution
did not challenge the validity of the Cuban Government's actions
in the instant case. 3 Chase, therefore, could not assert the act of
state doctrine as a defense.
The dissent believed that the act of state doctrine precluded
Chase's liability in the instant case, 4 reasoning that the applicability of the doctrine depended on the power of the Cuban Government to enforce or collect the debt within Cuba. 5 Reviewing
the case, the dissent found that the majority had inadequately
considered several crucial facts: (1) the debt owed to Garcia was
collectible in Cuba; (2) the agreement between Garcia and the
bank was not intended to guarantee Garcia's deposit against confiscation by the Cuban Government; and (3) the Government had
confiscated Garcia's assets independently of its later seizure of
Chase's own assets and liabilities in the bank's Cuban branches.88
78. 735 F.2d at 649.
79. Id. at 650.
80. Id. (quoting Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d
854, 863 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982)).
81. Id. at 651.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Contrary to the majority's finding that the agreement between
Chase and the plaintiff insured the safety of plaintiff's money
against confiscation, the dissent, relying on the jury determination,87 found that the parties had not contemplated a guaranfee
against subsequent government confiscation of the plaintiff's
funds."" The dissent concluded, therefore, that the parties to the
agreement never intended that Chase would absolutely insure the
plaintiff's deposit.
The dissent found that a debt, although a single obligation,
may have more than one situs.8 9 Relying on Harris v. Balk,90 the
dissent concluded that a debt, because it is a single obligation, is
extinguished once it is collected pursuant to a valid decree."1 Consequently, the dissent would rule that having previously paid the
debt in compliance with a valid decree of the Cuban Government,
Chase was not required to pay the same debt a second time to
Garcia. 2 Furthermore, the dissent found it'significant that Cuba
was never excluded by the parties as a place of payment to Garcia
on the certificates of deposit. 3 Prior to the Cuban Government's
expropriation of Chase's Cuban branch banks in September 1960,
Garcia's certificates had been payable in Cuba under the terms of
the deposit agreement. The dissent reasoned that the Cuban Government could confiscate payment of the debt because Garcia
could exercise the option to obtain payment in Cuba.94 Garcia
could collect on the debt only by presenting the certificates of
deposit to Chase for payment. The dissent concluded, therefore,
that the act of state doctrine prevented an examination of the
validity of the Cuban Government's implicit determination that it
need not present the certificates of deposit prior to confiscating
95
the debt owed to Garcia.

87. The dissent reasoned that answers given by the jury to interrogatories
supported a finding that the parties did not contemplate that their agreement
covered confiscation of the debt by the Cuban Government. Id. at 652 & n.*.
88. Id. at 652.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
91. See Garcia, 735 F.2d at 653.
92. See id. The dissent implicitly adopted the Harriscourt's stated objective.
See supra note 32.

93. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 652.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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IV. COMMENT

The court of appeals' conclusion that the act of state doctrine
was inapplicable to the Cuban Government's confiscation in the
instant case is completely out of harmony with prior decisions on
similar facts. The court failed to acknowledge significant distinctions between the instant decision and previous cases, such as
Russek, Sokoloff, and Vishipco, in which courts refused to apply
the act of state doctrine in disputes arising out of a foreign government's expropriation of bank deposits.9
The instant opinion relied on Russek to rule that the Cuban
Government confiscated funds belonging to Chase, rather than
the funds on deposit in Garcia's account with Chase. A sixty-year
old decision by a Texas state court that no court outside of Texas
had previously cited9 7 is not very convincing authority for an issue of federal jurisdiction. In Russek the disputed certificate of
deposit had not matured at the time of confiscation, and existence of the Mexican statute that allegedly relieved the bankers
of liability was never proven to the satisfaction of the court. Although the rationale underlying its decision is vague, the Russek
court could reasonably have concluded that the bankers had paid
their own funds to the Mexican Government because they obtained the money for payment from a Texas bank. If the deposit
with the bankers was located in the Texas bank, the Russek court
correctly refused to apply the act of state doctrine because the
seized property was not located within Mexican territory. In the
instant case, however, the majority implicitly found that the situs
of the certificates of deposit was outside Cuba because Chase had
agreed to honor the certificates at any of its worldwide
branches."" The dissent, on the other hand, correctly noted that
although the certificates were payable at any Chase bank worldwide, they also were payable at Cuban branches at the time of
confiscation by the Cuban Government." Thus, if the certificates
were payable in Cuba, and both Chase and Garcia were in Cuba,
then the Cuban Government's confiscation of the certificates constituted an act of state. Unlike Russek, therefore, the act of state
doctrine controlled the instant decision.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 5.
supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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The Sokoloff court rejected the applicability of the act of state
doctrine primarily because the Soviet Government was not recognized by the United States when the bank deposits had been confiscated. In Sokoloff, the Soviet Government initially had confiscated only the bank's assets, but later confiscated the accounts of
all Soviet citizens. Contrary to the circumstances of Sokoloff, in
the instant case the new Cuban Government had been duly recognized by the United States and had confiscated Garcia's account
before it confiscated Chase's assets. 00 Thus, the primary reason
for the Sokoloff court's rejection of the act of state doctrine has
minimal relevance to the instant situation.
Nor is the Vishipco decision any more relevant to the instant
dispute.' 0 ' In Vishipco, Chase had ceased all operations at its Saigon branch prior to confiscation of the bank's assets and deposits.
Adhering to the general rule controlling the situs of intangible
property, the Vishipco court correctly concluded that the act of
state doctrine was inapplicable because the Vietnamese Government could not confiscate the bank deposits if Chase no longer
operated in Vietnam. Unlike Vishipco, in the instant case Chase's
Cuban branch banks operated normally into the year following
the confiscation of Garcia's account. Chase, the debtor of Garcia,
had maintained its presence in Cuba and remained subject to the
jurisdiction of the Cuban Government when it complied with the
expropriation decree. As the dissent correctly perceived, the act
of state doctrine precluded an examination of the Cuban Government's confiscation of Chase's debt to Garcia.
In the instant case, Chase and Garcia had agreed that Chase
would pay the certificates of deposit at any of its branches worldwide. Chase's debt, therefore, was potentially payable both inside
and outside Cuba. Because application of the act of state doctrine
usually depends on whether the property is located within or
02
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign government,'
the instant court faced an unusual dilemma. It had to decide as a
matter of first impression whether a bank debt payable both at
the bank's branches within the country and at any branch worldwide remained payable to the depositor after the bank made payment under a direct government order. The dissent correctly
stated that the applicability of the act of state doctrine in the

100.
101.
102.

See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12.
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instant case depends on the power of the Cuban Government to
collect the debt. The majority sidestepped the dilemma and imposed liability on the basis of the agreement between Chase and
Garcia, characterizing it as an agreement to guarantee the safety
of Garcia's money. 10 3 Unfortunately, the court did not take into
account the political climate in Cuba at the time the plaintiff had
entered into the deposit agreement with Chase. Garcia and her
husband were associated with the Batista Government, which was
losing a revolutionary insurrection. The court emphasized that
Chase had entered a private agreement with Garcia to insure the
safety of Garcia's money. Chase's guarantee had provided insurance only to the extent that Chase, a neutral entity in Cuba,
could facilitate conversion of Garcia's Cuban pesos into United
States currency 0 4 without Cuban Government interference. As a
practical matter, Garcia and her husband could not depart Cuba
with large amounts of Cuban currency in their possession. Given
that inability, Chase's obligation was intended merely to make
the deposited funds available for withdrawal at any of its worldwide branches, including those in Cuba. Implicit in any guarantee
by Chase was that Chase would only make payment once against
the deposit. Consequently, Chase offered protection to Garcia's
funds by insuring the validity of the certificates, which were purchased in Cuban currency, against any subsequent deterioration
of relations between the United States and Cuba and the devaluation or resulting worthlessness of the Cuban pesos. Expropriation of Garcia's individual account, however, was not anticipated.
As the subsequent nationalization of Chase's Cuban branches
demonstrated, the bank was unable to protect its own assets, let
alone the assets of the depositor. Thus, the court could reasona-.
bly have concluded, as did the dissent, that because Chase and
Garcia had failed to contemplate the confiscation by the Cuban
Government, the parties had never intended that Chase would
absolutely insure Garcia's deposit.
Although the court of appeals does not discuss the effect of the
Hickenlooper Amendment on the act of state doctrine, the Perez
court correctly decided that the amendment was inapplicable
when the Cuban Government expropriated property owned by
Cuban citizens and located within Cuba.105 Consequently, the
103.
104.
105.

See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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amendment, characterized as an exception to the act of state doctrine, cannot preclude an application of the act of state doctrine
in the instant case, implicitly or otherwise.
The majority claimed to be reaching a result consistent with
the policy underlying the act of state doctrine. One major policy
is to avoid adjudications of the validity of an act of a foreign government occurring within its own territory. The court found that
it had not examined the acts of the Cuban Government, but
merely resolved a private dispute between Chase and the plaintiff
Garcia. 106 To reach the conclusion that the Cuban Government
had marched into Chase's Cuban branch, armed with a decree in
the manner of an armed gunman, 10 7 and forced Chase to relin-

quish plaintiff's deposit without protest, the court conducted exactly the kind of examination the doctrine condemns. Because it
required Chase to suffer the consequences of this encounter with
the Cuban Government, the court necessarily concluded that the
Government did not exercise sufficient authority to confiscate
plaintiff's deposit.
The instant court argued that a bank cannot be compelled to
redeem a certificate of deposit without obtaining the certificate,
and that the bank acts at its own peril if it does redeem without
obtaining either the certificate or a properly executed release.108
Ordinarily, this would be true. In the instant case, however,
Chase failed to obtain the certificates because the Cuban Government demanded payment on behalf of one of its citizens and pursuant to a presumably valid decree. Under these extraordinary
circumstances it is hardly reasonable to require that Chase conform to ordinary commercial practices.
Prior decisions have rejected application of the act of state doctrine when the courts determined that the debt was located
outside the foreign country and its collection merely attempted
by the foreign government or its instrumentality. 10 9 The debt in
the instant case, like the debts disputed in the prior decisions,
had a situs outside the foreign country, but the expropriation of
the deposit was effectively a fait accompli. Contrary to prior decisions, the instant court had to determine the applicability of the
act of state doctrine to a disputed debt with more than one situs.
106.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

107. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
108.
109.

See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the debt had been collected by a governmental decree entitled to a presumption of validity in the courts of the
United States. The instant decision establishes an influential precedent that could undermine the presumption favoring governmental acts that successfully take extraterritorial property. That
outcome would ignore the fundamental purposes of the act of
state doctrine and erroneously impose double liability on banks
that find themselves in a predicament like the one that faced
Chase.
Jesse T. Wilkins

JURISDICTION-CoMMERCIAL ACTIVITY As APPLIED TO THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE. Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
I. FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs, United States citizens, brought suit against
Bancomer, a Mexican bank, for breach of contracts of deposit and
violations of securities laws.1 Beginning in 1981, plaintiffs purchased peso- and dollar-denominated certificates of deposit issued
by Bancomer's Mexico City office. The certificates fixed Mexico
City as the place of deposit and payment of principal and interest; they were to be repaid in United States dollars upon maturity
in September 1982 and February 1983.2 During the summer of
1982 falling oil prices precipitated a severe economic crisis for the
Mexican Government.3 To stabilize the currency and reduce the
flow of foreign exchange, the Mexican Government issued a series
of decrees between September and December of 1982. The decrees nationalized all private Mexican banks, including
Bancomer; required that all domestic obligations for payments in
foreign currency be performed by delivering an equivalent
amount in pesos at the official exchange rate; and established official rates of exchange for repayment of dollar-denominated certificates of deposit.4 Because the official exchange rate was lower
than the prevailing market exchange rate, plaintiffs contended
that Bancomer's repayment of the obligation in pesos instead of
United States dollars constituted a breach of contract that caused
them to suffer damages of $994,800. 5 Bancomer argued that under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)6 the district court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, and that even if jurisdiction existed the act of state doctrine precluded the court from
1.

Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

2. Id. at 1466.
3. Id. at 1467. For a complete discussion of the Mexican economic crisis and
its aftermath, see Special Project, Legal Issues Arising from the Mexican Economic Crisis, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1984).
4. 589 F. Supp. at 1467.
5.

Id.

6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
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adjudicating the dispute.7 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the case for failure to state a
cause of action. Held: Although the court did have jurisdiction to
hear the case because Bancomer's breach of the contract was a
commercial act and therefore fit within the commercial exception
of the FSIA, the Mexican decrees requiring payment of the obligation at official exchange rates were sovereign acts, whose legality could not be questioned in United States courts under the act
of state doctrine.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Commercial Activities Exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity denies a domestic court jurisdiction to hear a claim against a foreign state9 by virtue of the
defendant's status as a sovereign. 10 There are two conflicting theories of sovereign immunity. Under the absolute theory, a sover7. The plaintiffs argued that the court could hear the case under the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), even if the act of state doctrine applied. The Hickenlooper Amendment provides that a United States
court can hear a case even if the act of state doctrine would apply when the
foreign state has violated international law. The court noted that under French
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 55-56, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 442-43, 242
N.E.2d 704, 710-11 (1968), a law that changes either the value or character of
the currency to be paid under a contract is not a "confiscation" or a "taking."
The court also noted that foreign exchange controls are accepted under international law and thus, found the Hickenlooper Amendment inapplicable. Braka,
589 F. Supp. at 1472-73; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 198 (1965).
8. 589 F. Supp. at 1474. The plaintiffs also argued that Bancomer failed to
register a security in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) and misrepresented the
sale of a security in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77q. 589 F. Supp. at 1467. The court
did not reach these issues after holding that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by
the act of state doctrine. Id. at 1474. The Ninth Circuit recently held that a
Mexican certificate of deposit does not constitute a security. See Wolf v. Banco
Nacional de Mexico, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 784
(1985); see also Special Project, supra note 3, at 447-63 (1984) (commenting on

Wolf).
9. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725-26 (1976). (Marshall, J., dissenting); see National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,
358-59 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 65 (1965).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS
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eign state must consent in order to be sued in the courts of another sovereign state;11 the restrictive theory exempts a
sovereign's public or governmental acts from consequential suits,
but not its commercial or proprietary acts.12
Traditionally, courts in the United States have relied heavily
on the suggestions of the State Department in deciding whether
to grant sovereign immunity.13 The policy of judicial deference
continued after 1952 when the State Department adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in what became known as
the Tate Letter.24 In 1976 Congress enacted the FSIA which codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.', The FSIA
gives federal and state courts the power to decide claims of sovereign immunity by foreign states16 and provides an exception
granting jurisdiction "in any case in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state.'

7

11. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 711; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69, reporters' notes at 214 (1965).

12. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698.
13. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1955).
14. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698. See id. at 711-15 for a reproduction of the Tate
Letter.
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982). The FSIA was held to be constitutional in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1970-73 (1983).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity
with the principles set forth in this chapter." Id. See generally Verlinden, 103
S.Ct. at 1968-69 (discussing the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the effect of the FSIA on the courts).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982),
the court noted that section 1605(a)(2) calls for the resolution of five questions:
1) Does the conduct the action is based upon or related to qualify as
"commercial activity"?
2) Does that commercial activity bear the relation to the cause of action and to the United States described by one of the three phrases of §
1605(a)(2), warranting the court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction
under § 1330(a)?
3) Does the exercise of this congressional subject matter jurisdiction lie
within the permissible limits of the "judicial power" set forth in Article
III?
4) Do subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a) and service under §
1608 exist, thereby making personal jurisdiction proper under § 1330(b)?
5) Does the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b) comply
with the due process clause, thus making personal jurisdiction proper?
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The FSIA defines a commercial activity as a "regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act."1 8 The definition requires that a court look to the nature of
the conduct or transaction in question rather than to its purpose
to determine whether the foreign state has engaged in commercial
activity. 19 In Najarro de Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicara-

gua,20 for example, the plaintiffs demanded that the issuer, a private Nicaraguan bank, repay their certificate of deposit in United
States dollars. Because Nicaraguan law required that all disbursements of foreign currency were to be made through Nicaragua's
central bank in order to maintain official rates of exchange, the
central bank issued a check for United States dollars directly to
the plaintiffs. Before the plaintiffs could cash the check, however,
the central bank stopped payment. 21 Although the district court
admitted that the relationship between the plaintiff and Banco
Nacional was commercial, it held that the central bank's role in
the transaction was to monitor foreign currency transactions and
therefore was undertaken in a governmental capacity.2 2 In other

words, the nature of issuing a check in a foreign currency was
governmental even though the underlying purpose for repaying
the obligation could be considered commercial.2
The legislative history of the FSIA provides little guidance in
defining exactly what activities are commercial; it states only that
the definition includes sales or purchases from United States concerns and any indebtedness a foreign state might incur within the
United States or from a United States lender.24 Generally, courts
have looked at three factors to determine whether an activity is
647 F.2d at 308.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
19. Id.
20. 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981).
21. Id. at 901.
22. Id. at 909-10.
23. Obviously, the nature/purpose distinction generally arises when the nature of the transaction is commercial even though its purpose is governmental.
The de Sanchez case shows, however, that when the nature of the transaction is
governmental, the commercial exception of the FSIA does not apply even
though the underlying purpose of the transaction could be construed as commercial. The case also demonstrates that a court must first define the act that
allegedly injured the plaintiff before deciding whether that act is commercial.
See Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts
Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV.1440, 1482 (1983).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 17, reprinted at 6615-16.
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commercial: 1) whether the activity was carried on for profit; 25 2)
26
whether a private person could engage in this type of activity;
and 3) whether there was a contract.2 7 The most important of the
three factors is the existence of a contract; some courts have characterized activity as commercial solely on the basis of this factor.28 These courts believe that a contract implies a certain degree
of voluntariness and consent to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign state.2 9 Moreover, the nonsovereign nature of a contract between a private party and a sovereign state is accepted under international law.30
One court has limited the scope of the commercial activities exception to exclude acts that a commercial enterprise of a foreign
government had been compelled to perform. In Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,31 the plaintiffs had purchased a
package tour of the Dominican Republic, but they were denied
entry upon arrival at Santo Domingo airport because government
officials considered them to be undesirable aliens. The plaintiffs
were forced to leave the country immediately on a flight to Puerto
Rico.3 2 Among their claims the plaintiffs charged Dominicana, the
Dominican-owned airline, with false imprisonment and battery.
The court dismissed these claims, concluding they did not fit
within the commercial activities exception because Dominicana
had been "impressed into service ... by Dominican immigration
officials pursuant to that country's laws" and had "acted merely
as an arm" of the Dominican Government.3 3 Thus, Dominicana
was entitled to the same immunity from liability arising from performing a governmental function that the Dominican Govern-

25. de Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 909; Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp.
309, 312 (W.D. Tex. 1980); United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609,
611 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see Note, supra note 23, at 1482. Generally when a court
examines the transaction to determine if it was carried on at a profit, the focus
is on the private individual instead of the foreign state. Id. at 1484.
26. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 308-10; de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see Note, supra note
23, at 1482-83.
27. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 308-10; In re Sedco Inc., 543
F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D.Tex. 1982); see Note, supra note 23, at 1483.
28. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 309.
29. Note, supra note 23, at 1491.
30. Id. at 1492.
31. 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
32. Id. at 1373-74.

33. Id. at 1379.
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ment itself would enjoy.3 4
The application of the commercial activities exception to commercial enterprises complying with the order of a foreign sovereign grew more complicated following Frankel v. Banco Nacional
de Mexico.3 5 On facts virtually identical to those in the instant
case, 36 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that the recently nationalized Mexican bank was immune
from suit under the FSIA. The court noted that the only action
that was a breach of the deposit contract was Banco Nacional's
compliance with the currency control rules and regulations.3 7 The
court stated further that promulgation of currency control laws is
a governmental act.38 Focusing exclusively upon the Mexican currency controls, the court concluded, "[t]his is precisely the type of
governmental activity that cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny under. . . the FSIA." 39 The Frankel court did not analyze

34. Id. The court did allow a breach of contract claim stating that the claim
was plainly derived from the defendant's commercial activity and was not
barred by the FSIA. Id. at 1379-80. The court in Arango could have reached the
same conclusion to dismiss the claims without exploring whether or not there
was commercial activity, because the FSIA does not appear to grant jurisdiction
to hear cases concerning tortious acts committed outside of the United States.
See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 20-21, reprinted at 6619 (stating that
noncommercial torts must be committed within the United States to fall within
the jurisdictional grant of the FSIA). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (general
exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state). Arango was criticized in de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1501 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
35. No. 82-6457 (S.D.N.Y., May 31, 1983).
36. See id., slip op. at 2.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Frankeldecision has been followed by Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,
No. 3-82-1604-05-D (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 1984), cited in Braka, 589 F. Supp..4t
1468-69. In Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco.Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp.1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court reached the opposite conclusion, holding the
breach of the debt obligation was within the commercial exception to the FSIA.
In Allied Bank the plaintiffs had loaned money to Banco Credito, a Costa Rican
bank. Costa Rica imposed restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, and
Banco Credito was prohibited by Costa Rica's central bank from paying the debt
owed to the plaintiff. In a suit to enforce the obligation, the court noted that
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction
when the lawsuit is based upon an act outside the United States in connection
with a commercial activity within the United States. 566 F. Supp. at 1443. The
court held that the execution of the notes, upon which the suit was based, was a
commercial activity and, therefore, that the commercial activity exception ap-
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plaintiffs' claim that Banco Nacional breached a contract "in the
course of its purely commercial banking activities," nor did it examine the language of the contract itself to establish the situs of
the debt.40 The court added in a footnote that the claim would
also be barred by the act of state doctrine. 41 In the instant decision a court again was asked to determine the proper scope of
judicial review under the FSIA when ordinary commercial obligations are altered by the order of a sovereign.
B.

The Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine precludes judicial examination of the
validity of a foreign sovereign's act, based upon the principle that
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. 4 2 The
doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity and act of state both address considerations of comity and separation of powers, but they
apply in different situations and serve different functions. Sovereign immunity conditions the jurisdiction of the court, while the
act of state doctrine applies to the issues in the case. In addition,
foreign sovereign immunity concerns actions of a foreign state
within the forum state, whereas the act of state doctrine focuses
on a foreign state's actions within its own territory. 43 Although

plied to the case. Id.
40. Frankel, slip op. at 4.
41. Id. at 4 n.4,
42. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972) ("The doctrine
precludes any review whatsoever of the acts of the government of one sovereign
state done within its own territory by the courts of another sovereign state."
(emphasis added)); Note, JudicialBalancing of Foreign Policy Considerations:
Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN.L. REV. 327, 329
(1983).
43.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 428, reporter's note 9 at 11-12 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983).
In a dispute over a breach of a debt obligation the court must determine the
location of the debt before it can address the act of state doctrine. In Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984), for example, the plaintiff
Garcia bought certificates of deposits in 1958 from Chase only after being assured by bank officers that he could receive payment in United States dollars in
any of the bank's branches worldwide. The Cuban Government subsequently
nationalized the bank's Cuban branch and confiscated Garcia's account. Id. at
646-47. The court noted that if the situs of the debt was in Cuba, the Cuban
Government could have validly seized it. Id. at 650. In this case, however, the
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international law does not require application of the act of state
doctrine,44 the doctrine has a constitutional basis because it helps
shape the relationships among the branches of the federal government according to the principle of separation of powers. 45 The act
of state doctrine allows the executive and legislative branches to
resolve politically sensitive questions without judicial interference. 46 The doctrine, however, is not inflexible. The importance of
an issue to United States foreign relations is directly related to
the degree of deference the courts will extend to the political
7
branches.4
A plurality of the Supreme Court first suggested that a government action having merely commercial consequences would not
be protected under the act of state doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba.48 Following the nationalization of the Cuban cigar manufacturing industry in 1960, Dunhill paid a stateowned manufacturer debts owed for cigars sold by the company's
previous private management. The former owners sued Dunhill
and other importers for the debt. The district court held for the
plaintiffs, but found that the importers were entitled to set-off
payments already made to the nationalized companies. 49 The district court also held that under quasi-contractual principles, the
receipt of the mistaken payments exceeding the amount to which
they were entitled for post-intervention shipments obligated the
nationalized companies to repay the difference to Dunhill.5 0 A

purpose of the transaction was to avoid such a seizure. The court found that the
debt was not in Cuba; thus, the Cuban Government could not have seized it, and
the act of state doctrine would not bar a suit to collect the debt. Id.; see also
Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (debt located in a foreign country).
44. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
45. Id. at 423.
46. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649
F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
47. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
48. 425 U.S. 682 (1976), aff'g Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F.
Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485
F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
49. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, 345 F. Supp. at 534-35. The Second
Circuit did not disturb this part of the district court's decision. 485 F.2d at
1368-74.
50. Id. at 564. The Second Circuit reversed the district court on this point,
holding that the act of state doctrine precluded affirmative recovery by Dunhill.
485 F.2d at 1374.
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majority of the Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine
did not preclude a United States court from ordering Cuba to pay
the obligation because there was no "statute, decree, order, or res-

5
olution" or other act of state to which the doctrine could apply. 1

Four members of the majority52 went on to state that "the cons
cept of an act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign
sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities."5 3
The Dunhill decision has prompted many courts to recognize a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine.54 In Behring
International,Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,55 for example,
the court distinguished the public or governmental acts of a sovereign from its private or commercial acts.5 After the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 the Iranian Air Force refused to pay the
amounts it owed Behring, an international commercial freight
service, which then sued to collect the outstanding balance. The
court found that the Air Force's repudiation of the debt was a
commercial act and therefore the act of state doctrine did not
57

apply.

In addition to judicial recognition of a commercial activities exception, the drafters of the FSIA followed the view expressed by
the four justices in Dunhill.55 The House Report quoted from the
Solicitor General's amicus brief in Dunhill: "'To elevate the foreign state's commercial acts to the protected status of "acts of
state" would frustrate [the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity] by permitting sovereign immunity to reenter through the
back door, under the guise of the act of state doctrine.' "
Nevertheless, some courts have refused to recognize a formal
51. 425 U.S. at 695.
52. Justice Stevens did not.join this part of the opinion. Id. at 715 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
53. Id. (opinion of White, J.).
54. See, e.g., Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v.
Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1981); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550

F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Behring Int'l, Inc. v.
Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 401 (D.N.J. 1979).
55. 475 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1979).

56. Id. at 401.
57.

Id.

58. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 20 n.1, reprinted at 6619 n.1.
59.

Id. (quoting Amicus Brief of United States at 41, Dunhill).
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commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine.6 0 These
courts follow only the first part of Dunhill 1l and apply the act of
state doctrine whenever the state has acted in its sovereign capacity by issuing a statute, decree, or order.6 2 For example, in National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria63 the district court applied this approach to determine whether a dispute
was appropriate for judicial resolution. The Nigerian Government
had ordered cement from the plaintiff and numerous other cement suppliers. Subsequently realizing that it had over-ordered
cement, the government closed Nigerian ports by decree and refused to pay for cement in transit. The court held that the closing
of the port constituted an act of state because it was accomplished by governmental decree;6 4 the breach of the contract,
however, was "not an extension of closing the port" and therefore
was not within the act of state doctrine.6 In the instant case, the
court was asked to look beyond the mere existence of a formal
government decree to consider whether the arguably commercial
nature of the effects of the act might render application of the act
of state doctrine inappropriate.
III. THE

INSTANT OPINION

The district court first found that it had jurisdiction because
Bancomer's breach of the obligation to pay the plaintiffs in
United States dollars was a commercial activity under the FSIA.6 6
The court noted that the first step in resolving an FSIA issue,
prior to characterizing an act as governmental or commercial, is
to define the activity and the act in connection with that activity
that produced the claim.67 In this case the issuance of the certificate of deposit was the activity, and breach of the deposit contract was the act that was the basis of the plaintiffs' claim. 8 By
focusing on the acts that were the basis for the contract claim
60. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976).
61. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
OPEC,

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 606.
448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 640-41.

66.

Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

67. Id. at 1469.
68. Id.
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instead of separate acts of the Mexican Government, the court
rejected the approach taken in Frankel. 9 While recognizing that
Bancomer was prevented from complying with its contractual obligation by a governmental decree, the court concluded that this
alone would not immunize Bancomer from suit as an agent of
Mexico.70
Although Bancomer was not immune from suit, the court held
that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the act of state doctrine. 1 Because the certificates stated that Mexico City was the
location of the debt and that all principal and interest were to be
paid in Mexico, the court found that the situs of the debt was
Mexico.7 21 The court also suggested that the high interest rates
paid on the deposits were necessary to induce foreign investors to
accept the risk that their deposited dollars would be subject to
domestic currency export controls.73 It noted further that the
debt had been discharged under Mexican law because the certificate of deposit had been presented and payment had been made
in pesos at the official exchange rate. 4 Mexico's act, therefore,
was not a simple repudiation of a commercial debt as in Dunhill,
but was part of the governmental function of controlling foreign
currency through formal executive and legislative decrees. 5 A
judgment for the plaintiffs effectively would countermand the
Mexican decrees,7 6 which persuaded the court that the Mexican
Government's allocation of the rights of the parties in this case
was shielded from the intrusive scrutiny of the United States judiciary by the act of state doctrine."

69. Id.; see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
70. 589 F. Supp. at 1470.
71. Id. at 1472.
72. Id. at 1471. The court used these features of the deposit contract to distinguish this case from Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.
1984). See supra note 42.
73. 589 F. Supp. at 1471.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1472.
76. Id. at 1474.
77. The court found no violation under the Hickenlooper Amendment, id. at
1472-73; see supra note 7, and did not address the securities issue, see supra
note 8.
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IV. COMMENT

The district court in the instant decision correctly recognized
the conceptual distinctions between the FSIA and the act of state
doctrine and wisely maintained those distinctions throughout its
analysis of a complex factual situation involving both commercial
and governmental actions. The court's initial conclusion that
Bancomer was subject to suit pursuant to the commercial activities exception of the FSIA is sound. Clearly, Bancomer's breach
of the deposit contract satisfied all three factors of the test employed by most courts to determine whether an activity is commercial in nature. 78 First, the activity in Braka was carried on for
profit. The court noted that the deposits paid a relatively high
rate of interest suggesting that the risk of Mexico's imposing foreign exchange controls was foreseeable and already factored into
the rate of return of the deposits.7 9 Second, because there is nothing particularly public or governmental about issuing a certificate
of deposit, the conduct was one in which a private person could
engage.80 Bancomer itself had been a private bank at the time the
deposit agreements were concluded.81 Last and most important,
there was a contract between the parties. Independent of the
three-factor test, the legislative history of the FSIA specifically
states that an "indebtedness incurred by a foreign state" is to be
included in the definition of "commercial activities. ' 2 By contrast, the analysis adopted by the Frankel court 8 and supported
by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Arangos4 creates unnecessary
confusion when determining whether a sovereign's commercial activities fit the exception. These cases reason that no commercial
activity exists when an entity is forced to follow the law of a foreign sovereign. The problem with this rationale, as is apparent in
the instant case, is that the conclusion ignores the nature/purpose
distinction required by the FSIA.8 5 Although promulgating foreign currency exchange rates is a governmental function, it was
only the underlying purpose or reason for Bancomer's breach.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1471.
Id. at 1470.
Id.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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The nature of the deposit agreement remained inherently commercial and therefore fits within the commercial exception to the
FSIA.88
In choosing to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the act of state
doctrine, the instant court reaffirmed its view that if a statute,
decree, or order by a sovereign state is present, the doctrine will
apply. 7 The result probably would have been the same had the
court been willing to find a "commercial exception" to the act of
state doctrine, as the plaintiffs had urged, because courts have
been unwilling to adjudicate the validity of a foreign state's formal statute, decree, or order no matter how purely commercial
that act of state might have been. 88 Although the legislative history of the FSIA would appear to support an extension of the
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine, courts have
wisely withheld express recognition of the exception. 89 An express, judicially-created commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine would encourage courts to "sit in judgment" of sovereign
acts of the government of another country; a sovereign act would
need only be deemed sufficiently "commercial" to be challenged
by the United States judiciary. This outcome clearly is not contemplated by the act of state doctrine." To apply the doctrine
whenever there is a statute, decree, or order, the approach continued by the instant court, would be more consistent with the purpose of the act of state doctrine. In the absence of a formal sovereign act the doctrine should not be applied unless the case
involves a "politically sensitive issue." 1 This approach has been
criticized for ignoring "broader policy concerns," and the suggestion has been made that the "inquiry should be to the separation

86. A corollary problem with the approach taken in Frankelis that it focuses

on the- wrong act. In both the instant case and Frankel,the plaintiffs sued because of the breach of a deposit contract, not because of the Mexican decrees.

The latter acts are the subject of the act of state doctrine.
87. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.

88. See, e.g., Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivades v.
Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1981) (Delaware sugar broker's claim

against Cuban expropriation precluded from litigation under the act of state
doctrine); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (expropriation of

Libyan oil producer precluded from litigation under the act of state doctrine),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).

89. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

91. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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of powers and foreign relations concerns. ' 92 Although the Supreme Court has already stated that two of the principles underlying the act of state doctrine are the separation of powers and
federal nature of foreign relations, 11 courts should not reexamine
the principles in every dispute involving the acts of a foreign government. Because the doctrine is based on separation of powers
and foreign relations concerns, an act of Congress would be the
appropriate device to distinguish situations when these concerns
are present from situations when they are not.9 4 The legislative
history to the FSIA could be deemed to be such an enunciation of
United States policy, but that statement is neither strong enough
nor complete enough to give the courts adequate guidance. Until
more explicit guidance comes from Congress, the act of state doctrine should be applied strictly on the basis of whether a formal
statute, decree, or order of a foreign state precipitated the plaintiff's claim.
Joseph A. DiJulio

92.

Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mich.

1981).
93.
94.

See supra note 44-47 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 42, at 353.

